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1. Introduction
There is a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) that holds out the promise o f
giving us a profound insight into A ristotle’s view o f the good. The problem is that the
passage, A.6: 1096a23-29, has proved remarkably resistant to satisfactory interpretation,
defying the efforts o f scholars over the last eight decades. It argues, contra Plato, that the
good cannot be one thing and, according to Irw in’s translation,1 reads as follows:
Further, good is spoken o f in as many ways as being is spoken of. For it is spoken
o f in [the category of] w hat-it-is, as god and mind; in quality, as the virtues; in
quantity, as the measured amount; in relative, as the useful; in tim e, as the
opportune moment; in place, as the [right] situation; and so on. Hence it is clear
that the good cannot be some common [nature o f good things] that is universal
and single; for if it w ere, it would be spoken o f in only one o f the categories, not in
them all.
Just w hat is A ristotle saying here? The main problem seems to lie in understanding
what the relationship is betw een the good, or “good,” and the examples given: Just how
are they related such that “good” turns out to be spoken o f in as many ways as “being”—
or, as some would put it, to have as many senses as “being”? Are they things o f which
“good” is predicated? Or is each itself a good which is predicated o f something else? Or
are they neither subjects nor predicates o f sentences in which “good” occurs? If not, what
is the connection between “good” and the examples?
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2. Interpretations of Nicomachean Ethics A.6:1096a23-29 before Macdonald’s
Each o f these interpretations, and more, have been offered in the literature. Ross,2
for example, thought that “good” w as predicated o f the examples, giving us “God is
good,” “the virtues are good,” and so on.3 This is very appealing and the “most obvious”4
way to take them, especially on R oss’s translation, but the problem w ith it is that it does
not seem to make “good” multivocal. W hat is there to prevent “good” from having the
same sense, even though it is predicated o f items from different categories? As Irwin
rem arks,5 “we might as well say that “amusing” or “strange” is multivocal because both
substances and qualities can be amusing or strange.”6
Hardie,7 using an interpretation put forward earlier by Joachim,8 offered an
interpretation that seemed to overcome this problem He argued that “god is good,” “the
useM is good” and so on, “are not simply propositions in which good is a predicate
asserted o f various subjects; they are definitions. The predicate expresses the essence, or
part o f the essence, o f the subject; and it is, therefore, inevitably in the same category as
the subject.”9 “The argument [now] looks very much better,” Ackrill points out. “We
now have something approaching an identity-statem ent; and in such a statem ent the
predicate-item cannot fail to be in the same category as the subject-item .”10 One
assumption underlying this interpretation, however, is that “the term s in A ristotle’s
examples [--and, by implication, any other term s he might have chosen-] stand for
genuine species and . . . not merely portm anteau w ords;” and this, as Ackrill suggests,
would be difficult to show.11
Since taking “good” to be predicated o f the examples does not seem to help much,
perhaps w e should take the examples to be, not subjects, but predicates—that is, things
themselves predicated o f other things. This is the approach taken by Kosman.12 “[W]hen
w e say that Socrates is courageous, w e . . . predicate good o f him. For being courageous
or being virtuous in general is a good way to be; courage and virtue in general, that is, are
good qualities. The same analysis applies in each o f the other categories.” “The instances
that A ristotle gives, then, are not the subjects o f exemplary predicative statements, but

2See his translation o f the argument in 1915 (quoted above).
3 A lso Urmson (see 1988,23) and Santas (see 1989, 150)--even Irwin, in his own way (see 1981, 539)-subscribe to this interpretation.
4
Ackrill 1977, 17.
51981, 539.
6Although there is a real problem here, I believe that for Aristotle any term predicated cross-categorically
does indeed have different senses; I also believe that the way in which such a term would have different
senses turns out not to help this interpretation, and I argue for this point in “Goods and Predication in
Aristotle.”
7See Hardie 1980 (first edition, 1968), 56-88.
8See 1962, commentary on 1096a23ff.
9Hardie 1980, 57.
101977, 18.
111977, 19.
12See Kosman 1968,171 -74.
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rather the predicates o f such statem ents. They make clear that the m ultivocity o f “good”
is exhibited not only in the fact that many sorts o f things may be said to be good, but more
in the fact that predicates o f radically different type are in fact disguised means o f
predicating the good in radically different senses.”13 This makes admirable sense o f the
passage and puts A ristotle’s examples squarely into the several categories. Is it, however,
what A ristotle has in mind? N ot according to Ackrill: “p ]t does not seem easy to derive
this point from A ristotle’s text in the w ay Kösman suggests. It w ould be surprising if
A ristotle w ere illustrating the diversity o f senses o f ‘good’ by allusion to examples that do
not contain the w ord; this is not how he or anyone else normally proceeds when exhibiting
any kind o f ambiguity in a term . The context does not w arn us that the rather
sophisticated notion o f a disguised predication o f good is in play.”14
Ackrill him self proposes that the examples should be taken neither as subjects nor
as predicates but instead as indicating the criteria on the basis o f which things are called
good,15 and as occurring in sentences o f the following form: “_____ is good because it is
god,” “_____ is good because it is courageous (for example),” and “______is good
because it is useful,” and so o n .16 He elaborates:
There is to be no implication that the subject-term s are in different categories. The
point is that the ground for predicating “good” in the different cases is radically
different. If I say that Callias is good and am asked “how do you mean, ‘good’?”
or “why do you call him good?,” I answer “he is brave and honest.” But other
things may be commended as good for other reasons and indeed other sorts o f
reason—because they are o f the right size or usefiil for some purpose. The criteria
for commending different things as good are diverse and fall into different
categories; and this is enough to show that “good” does not stand for some single
common quality.
This approach seems to combine the virtues o f the past tw o: “good” is predicated
o f things, which is natural, yet the examples A ristotle gives are also much like Kosman’s
disguised predications o f it, and they therefore distribute themselves nicely among the
several categories. However, it is questionable w hether taking the examples to be the
criteria on the basis o f which “good” is applied w ill yield the desired result. As Rawls17
and others18 have pointed out, the criteria on the basis o f which “good” is applied may
differ while its meaning remains the same, and the same applies to term s other than
“good.” M acDonald has a very good example to illustrate this:
“H ot,” for instance, might well have a single sense or meaning despite the fact that
I appeal to radically diverse criteria in explaining my predicating “hot” o f various
items. I might explain my calling the vapor hot by pointing out that it is steam (a
substance); I might explain my calling the m olten iron hot by pointing out that it is
red (a quality); I might explain my calling the liquid hot by pointing out that it is
boiling (an action); and so on. Thus, if A ristotle’s point in the examples is that

131968, 174.
I41977, 20.
15See Ackrill 1977 (originally published in 1972), 21.
16See Ackrill 1977, 21.
17 See 1971, 405.
18 For example, Hare: see 1952, 108.
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different criteria, which fall into different categories, may be cited to justify
predicating “good” o f different things, then the examples he gives do nothing to
su p p o rt. . . the claim that “good” has may senses.19
Since Ackrill’s 1972 article there have been tw o serious attem pts at sorting out
this passage. One is by W oods,20 who in effect denies that any satisfactory interpretation
can be given o f this or the corresponding passage in the Eudemian Ethics (EE). The other
is by M acDonald.21

3. MacDonald’s interpretation
M acDonald, who uses Irw in’s translation o f the NE passage, concludes as follows:
W hen [Aristotle] says in EN i.6 that good is spoken o f in each o f the categories, he
means that goodness consists in various real properties, and the examples he lists
in i.6—some o f which are substances, some o f which are qualities, etc.—are some o f
those real p ro p erties___ Since god and mind are substances, the virtues qualities,
measured amounts quantities, etc.—it follows, given A ristotle’s view o f the
categories, that the good is not some common nature.22
I believe that this statem ent—and Irwin’s acknowledged influence in bringing it about23—
constitutes a very valuable contribution tow ard the explication o f this passage and, more
generally, tow ard understanding A ristotle’s theory o f the good. The statem ent is, I
believe, somewhat inprecise,24 but that is not a major flaw. The problem w ith
M acDonald’s interpretation lies not so much w ith the conclusion he arrives at but rather
w ith the specific interpretation o f the NE passage on the basis o f which he arrives at it.
“My strategy,” M acDonald asserts, is “to explain the puzzling passage from i.6 in
light o f the less opaque discussion in i.7.”25 This is the idea that lies at the heart o f his
interpretation. In the i.7 passage, A ristotle argues as follows:
But let us return once again to the good we are looking for, and consider
just w hat it could be, since it is apparently one thing in one action or craft, and
another thing in another; for it is one thing in medicine, another in generalship, and
so on for the rest.
W hat, then is the good in each o f these cases? Surely it is that for the sake
o f which the other things are done; and in medicine this is health, in generalship

191989, 158-59.
201992 (first edition, 1982), 65-69. Although W oods’s primary concern is w ith the corresponding passage
in the Eudemian Ethics, both, as he seems to agree (see 66), present essentially the same argument. I
y have argued against this interpretation elsewhere, at length (in “Goods and Predication in Aristotle”).
211989. I offer a somewhat fuller discussion o f these inteipretations—as w ell as m y own, positive account
o f NE 1096a23-29—in “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the Good.”
^ 1989, 172. A ll references to M acDonald’s work are to this article.
23 See 16Qn30.
24 Since Aristotle, as I shall argue, is not saying that goodness consists in various “real properties” (that is,
universels) but, more generally, in various realities or existents.
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victo ry ,. . . in another case something else, but in every action and decision it is
the end, since it is for the sake o f the end that everyone does the other things.26
According to MacDonald:
In the above passage, [Aristotle] says that the good is different in different
cases: health is the good in medicine . . . , victory in generalship. . . , etc. The
expression “the good in A is x” seems to be [his] preferred w ay o f saying that
action or activity A aims at some end (good) x. He uses the same expression27 i n .
. . Topics [107a5-7]. . . .
The passage from EN i.6 in which the argument from homonymy occurs is
strikingly similar. A ristotle says that good is spoken o f in the category o f what-itis . . . , in quality . . . ,28 etc. O f course, this passage uses “spoken o f i n . . .”29
where the other tw o passages omit “spoken of,” but this difference appears to be
unim portant___ Thus, for A ristotle, the expressions “the good in A is x” and
“good is spoken o f in A, w here it is x” seem to be interchangeable.
The similarity in the mode o f expression in these passages suggests that
A ristotle is making the same point in each o f th em The claim in EN i.7 is that
there is an end or good corresponding to activities such as medicine and
generalship, and these goods are, respectively, health and victory. By analogy,
then, A ristotle’s claim in EN i.6 appears to be that there is an end or good
corresponding to each o f the categories, and these goods are god and mind
corresponding to substance, the virtues corresponding to quality, and so on.30
At this point M acDonald runs into a problem How can there be a good or end for
all substances, for all qualities, and for all the other nonsubstances? As he him self says,
“whereas the claim in EN i.7 is clear and plausible, its analogue in EN i.6, at least at first
blush, seems bizarre and perhaps unintelligible.”31 In order to show that the analogue “is
intelligible and perhaps even plausible,”32 he says that he needs to define m ore precisely
what Aristotle means by the expression “the good in (or for an) A is x.”33 In this
expression, A ranges not only over human actions and activities, as it does in the A.7
passage, but also over things having a function, and “‘x ’ stands for the real nature or
property in which goodness consists relative to A, i.e., ‘x ’ specifies the nature which
‘good’ signifies in the case o f A(s). Thus, the expression ‘the good in (or for an) A is x ’ is
equivalent to ‘as far as A(s) is (are) concerned, goodness consists in x .’”34 He therefore
goes on to restate his interpretation o f A.6 in term s o f A.7 accordingly:
On my interpretation, when A ristotle says that the good in medicine is health, he is
saying that as far as medicine is concerned goodness consists in health.
Analogously, then, in the EN i.6 passage he is saying that as far as substance is
261097al5-22. Irwin’s translation.
27To be more precise, it o f course is not these expressions that occur in the passages but, i f anything,
substitution instances o f them.
28I have omitted only the Greek for the two italicized phrases.
29This is MacDonald’s ellipsis.
30163-64.
31164.
32164.
33For his attempt to do this, see 164-68 and 160-61.

34168.
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concerned goodness consists in (being) god and mind, as far as qualities are
concerned it consists in the virtues, and so on.35
This statem ent requires some explanation, as M acDonald recognizes, and he
attem pts first to explain, by reference to the function o f substances, w hat it means to say
that “as far as substance is concerned goodness consists in (being) god and mind.”
Socrates, according to M acDonald, has a certain function not only qua carpenter or
harpist or human being but also qua substance; any substance qua substance does, at least
in a sense.36 That function is to exist independently. “Existing independently can be
construed as perform ing a function, analogous to the w ay in which building and playing
the harp are functions.”37 M oreover, since the good for any thing having a function is
performing that function well,38 it is clear w hat the good for substances qua substances is:
“On analogy w ith the carpenter and the h a rp ist,. . . the good for substances (qua
substances) w ill be to exist independently well, i.e., to exist as independently as possible.
The good harpist is the one who plays w ell or m ost completely; the good substance will be
the one the existence o f which is m ost independent or com plete.”39 Although “substances
exist independently in virtue o f the fact that they can exist independently o f nonsubstance
particulars. . . while nonsubstance particulars cannot exist independently o f substances,”
in this sense no substance, including god and mind, exists m ore independently than any
other. “But A ristotle also recognizes at least one other sort o f independent existence. In
his discussion. . . o f the first mover A ristotle claims that there is a substance which exists
independently o f sensible things.. . . Clearly, not all substances exemplify this sort o f
independent existence; god an mind, and perhaps only god and mind, do.” Thus, “god and
mind exist more independently than other substances in virtue o f being independent in
more respects; they are most truly independent and complete. If god and mind are the
most compete substances, then they will be the end or good for substance.”40 This, then,
is w hat it means to say that “as far as substance is concerned goodness consists in (being)
god and mind.”
“[Q]ualities, quantities, places, and tim es,” however, “are not entities which can
be said to have functions as substances c a n . . . ,”41 and the good for them therefore
cannot be explained in term s o f performing a function w ell or completely. To put it in
other w ords, the good for these categories cannot be their paradigm instances, if
paradigms instances in a category are those members o f it that perform their function well
o r completely, because “there do not seem to be paradigm instances o f qualities,
quantities, places, and tim es in the w ay there are paradigm substances. One tim e is just as
much a time as any other, and the same seems to hold for qualities, quantities and so
on.”42 Nevertheless, there is “an extended sense [in which] w e can say that there are
paradigm instances o f qualities, quantities, etc.,” and that is insofar as they are “relative to

35168-69.
36See 169.
37169.
38See 164.
39169-70.
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actions, activities, and things which do have functions. ”43 For example, although “the
good quantities [are] the measured (or appropriate) am ounts. . . [w]hich quantity
constitutes the appropriate am ount. . . will depend on w hether w e are talking about meals
or missiles and, if meals, w hether meals for a heavyweight w restler o r a ballerina. In all
cases o f meals the good quantity will be the appropriate amount relative to the person
whose meal it is.”44 Similarly for the other nonsubstance categories. “The paradigm
qualities for a thing which has a function are those which enable that thing to perform its
function w ell--the virtues (relative to that function);. . . the paradigm place for an action,
an activity, or a thing having a function is the right situation (relative to the circumstances
or function). Thus, it is actions, activities, and things w ith functions w hich have ends or
goods, and qualities, quantities, relations, times and places are good relative to the goods
o f actions, activities, and things w ith functions.”45
This, as I understand it, is M acDonald’s case. It consists o f four main claims:
I. “The good in A is x” and “good is spoken o f in A, w here it is x” are
interchangeable. This claim allows him to interpret the A.6 passage in term s o f
. A.7 and to argue that there is an end for substances qua substances, for
qualities qua qualities, and so on. This is the key step in his argument.
II. In the expression “the good in (or for an) A is x,” the A ’s are human actions
and activities and things having a function, and the x ’s are real natures or
properties.
III. The end or good for substances qua substances is to exist as independently as
possible and, since god and mind are the substances that exist as independently
and completely as possible, god and mind are the ends or goods for substances
qua substances.
IV. There is “an extended sense” in which there are paradigm instances o f
nonsubstances, such that the virtues, the measured amount and the other
examples given by A ristotle are goods.
These four claims, in turn, allow him to conclude that in the A.6 passage A ristotle is
saying that goods are, or goodness consists in, various “real natures” or “properties”—
namely, the paradigm instances given as examples in the passage—and that, since these fall
into all the categories, the good cannot be one thing.

43

171.
171.
45
171-72.
44
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4. Are “the good in A is x” and “the good is spoken of in A, where it is x”
interchangeable?
A t a literal and superficial level it is clearly false that “the good in A is x” (in A.7)
and “‘good’ is spoken o f in A, w here it is x” (in A .6) are interchangeable, since the A.6
statement says the good in A is spoken o f in A in addition to saying that it is x. However,
if w e ignore this difference—and M acDonald, perhaps too readily, dismisses this difference
as ‘^mimportant”46—and if the A.7 and A.6 passages really are “strikingly similar,” then it
would seem reasonable to suppose that the expressions are interchangeable. Are they,
then, so very similar?
A closer reading does not seem to support the view that they are. Although they
have points in common, the main one being that goods are many, overall they are very
different—indeed almost opposed to each other.
I translate the A.7 passage as follows:
Again let us return to the good w e are seeking: W hat can it be? For it appears to
be one thing in one action or art and another in another: it is one thing in the art o f
medicine and another in the art o f generalship, and likewise in the rest. W hat,
then, is the good o f each? Is it not that for the sake o f which47 the other things are
done? In the art o f medicine this is health, in the art o f generalship victory, in the
art o f architecture a building, and in other spheres something else; that is, in every
action and course o f action48 it is the end,49 for all do w hatever else they do for the
sake o f this.
A ristotle’s point here is integrative: although in different actions (πράξεις) and courses o f
action (προαιρέσεις) the goods are specifically different, w hat they have in common is that
in every case the specific good is the end, that for the sake o f which the other things are
done.
The movement o f thought in the entire paragraph from which this passage is taken
is integrative. It is a movement tow ard identifying the good for man, the good tow ard
which all our actions ought to be directed. In the passage just quoted, A ristotle has set
him self up for answering that question, at least at a certain level. Having just claimed that
for all actions the good is the end, he goes on to finish the paragraph by concluding:
Therefore, if there is an end for absolutely all our actions, this would be the good
achievable by action, and if [there are] m ore than one, these would be.50
O f course, he spends most o f the rest o f A.7 arguing to the conclusion that there is indeed
an end or good for all our actions, for all distinctively human actions: “activity o f soul

46 See 163-64.
47
/
ου χαριν.
48Προαφέσει. Where πράξις and προαίρεσις axe opposed, προαίρεσις may mean “course o f action.” In the
old Oxford edition, Ross has “pursuit,” which seems accurate and perhaps more elegant. In the revised
Oxford edition, Urmson-Bames have “choice,” and Irwin has “decision.”
49το τέλος.
5022-24.
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[performed] in accordance w ith human excellence,”51 and he devotes most o f the rest o f
the NE to elaborating upon and explaining w hat this is supposed to mean.
The point o f the A. 6 passage is o f course more difficult to make out.
Understanding the passage is complicated by A ristotle’s use o f λέγεσθαι, especially its
occurrence right after he has claimed that good “is spoken o f ’ in as many ways as being is.
How is one to understand its meaning here? Taking the phrase in which it occurs to mean
“it is spoken o f in [the category of] w hat-it-is, as God and mi n d . . . as M acDonald does
(following Irwin), does not seem very helpful: Just w hat does this mean?; taking it to mean
“it is said . . . in the category o f substance, as god and reason,” as Ackrill does,52 is much
the same and seems equally puzzling; taking it to mean “it is predicated. . . in the category
o f substance, as o f God and reason,” as Ross does in the old Oxford edition,53 is
inaccurate; and taking it to mean “things are called g o o d . . . in the category o f substance,
as God and reason,” as Urmson-Bames do in the recently revised Oxford edition,54 seems
ill supported by the G reek.55
Perhaps “means,” one o f the standard meanings o f the verb in its active voice, is a
better translation o f λέγεσθαι here, as well as at its tw o other occurrences in our
paragraph.56 If so, then “X λέγεται διχώς/τριχώς/. . . ” (a very common construction)57
is literally translated as “X is meant in tw o w ays/three w a y s/. . . ’’--and more naturally
expressed as “X means tw o things/three things/. . . , ” the w ord “thing” here being taken in
a very broad sense. In this construction λέγεται is modified by an adverb o f manner, but
it often has this sense even when it is not.58 M oreover, I think that “means” here carries
the sense o f “signifies”—that is, that λέγεται here has the same meaning as σημαίνει often
has.59 This is not at all unusual in A ristotle, w ith many passages illustrating this use o f
λέγεται and σημαίνει. Indeed, many o f the passages which illustrate this use exhiba the
following pattern: “ ‘X ’ means many things [λέγεται πολλαχώς], for it signifies
[σημαίνει] a or b or c . . . , ” indicating that a term may mean several things because it
signifies several.60 The passage in the Eudemian Ethics (EE) which makes essentially the
same argument as the one in the NE w e are considering61 is a case in point;62 and, although
511098al6-17.
52See 1977, 17.
53See 1915.
54See Bam es 1984.
55I offer a fuller discussion o f these alternative translations in “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the
Good.”
56I offer a fidler defense o f this translation in “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the Good.”
57See, for example. Prior Analytics A .13:32b31-32 and B.21:67b3-5; Metaphysics A.2:1013b24,
4:1014bl6, 8:1017al4-15, 8:1017a23, 18:1022a24-36, and Z. 1:1028a 10; ¡wdDe Anima A .5:410al3.
58See, for example: Metaphysics Δ: l:1012b34, 3:1013b26, 4:1014b26, 5:1015a20, 6:1015bl6, 7:1017a7,
and 8:1017al0. Indeed, Aristotle often uses λέγεσθαι w ith and without an adverb or adverbial phrase
indiscriminately, w ith the same meaning; see, for exam ple. Metaphysics A.2:1013b24 and 29,
4:1014bl6 and 18, and 8:1017al4-15 and 17.
59I am therefore offering what M acDonald would call a “m ultiple-natures interpretation” o f our passage,
or at least someting close to it (see 160-62).
60This is illustrated in some o f the chapters from Metaphysics Δ; see, for example: 7:1017a7-8 and 22-24.
See also De Anima A .5:410al3-16, Metaphysics N .2:1089a7-10, and Metaphysics Z .l:1028al0-18.
61Although it also says more.
62That passage, A .8:1217b25-35, reads:
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the NE passage does not use λέγεται in the first clause and σημαίνει in the second,
instead using λέγεται in both, this seems merely to confirm that λέγεται should be
translated by “means” there and that it means “signifies.”63
I therefore propose to translate the A.6 passage as follows:
Further, since “good” means as many things as “being” [έπει ταγαθόν ίσαχώ ς
λέγεται τω δντι]—for it means [things] in the “what” [έν τω τί λέγεται] (for
example,64 god—that is,65 mind) and in quality (the virtues) and in quantity (the
m oderate-[am ount]) and in the relative (the useful) and in time ([the] opportune
time) and in place ([an] abode) and other things such as these—it is clear that it
cannot be a certain common universal—that is, one thing; for [then] it w ould not

“Good” m eans m any things, indeed as m any as [πολλαχώς λέγεται καί ίσαχώς] “being.” For
“being” . . . signifies [σημαίνει] sometimes w hat-it-is, som etim es quality, som etim es quantity,
sometimes tim e, and, in addition to these, som etim es [things] in the [category of] being-actedupon, som etim es [things] in the [category of] action, and the good is in each o f these categories:
in substance, m ind—that is, God; in quality, the just; in quantity, the moderate-amount; in tim e,
the opportune-time; and teaching and being-taught in the sphere o f action. Therefore, just as
being is not some one thing w ith regard to the things m entioned, so neither is good, nor is there
one science either o f being or o f the good.
63 A distinction m ay be drawn between the signification and the m eaning o f a term, where the
signification o f a term is the existent referred to by it and its m eaning is an “affection o f the soul”
sim ilar to the existent referred to (See De Interpretatione 1: 16a3-8) or a concept or some other m ental
content or its use or the criteria o f its application or that, among other things, which is entered in a
dictionary and competent speakers o f that language understand by it—or some other thing different from
the existent referred to. As I understand them, Irwin (see 1982, especially 242-43,246-48 and 264-66;
and 1981, especially 539-40 and 543) and M acDonald (see 153-62), follow ing him , would draw some
such distinction and say that, since for Aristotle the signification o f a term is some real nature, essence
or property and the m eaning o f a term is not, the m eaning and signification o f a term cannot be the
same thing for Aristotle. Presumably, then, they would not agree that λέγεται should be translated by
“means” and that it carries the sense o f “signifies” (σημαίνει). (Although they would not agree w ith
this, the result is that the goods referred to in the NE passage, and elsewhere, become realities, and this
outcome, I believe, would appeal to both.)
Let m e say at once that w ith this translation o f λέγεται I do not deny that m eaning and
signification m ay be different in Aristotle. “Genus” (γένος), for exam ple, signifies different things for
him when used to refer to genera in the different categories, yet it is not im plausible to suppose that it
has one and the same sense w hen it is; conversely, “one” (εν) and “being” (ov) signify the same things,
the constituents o f the categories, yet it would be incautious to assume that they have the same m eaning
for Aristotle. I only m aintain that m eaning and signification—and “means” and “signifies”— som etim es,
even often, come to the same thing for him .
I devote some more attention to Irwin’s view s elsewhere (in “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses
o f the Good”).
64 “For example” seem s a more likely rendering o f oiov than “I mean” or “that is.” “Good,” for Aristotle,
signifies m any more things than the ones m entioned here—as indicated, for exam ple, by Topics A. 15:
107a3-12 (which I quote and discuss a bit below) and Rhetoric A.6: 1362M 0-29 (which I quote and
discuss in “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the Good”).
65An epexegetic κ αί seem s preferable here. If καί had a conjunctive sense, what would this νους, which
would be other than god, be? Human νους in general? Any and every particular person’s νους? None
o f these seem to be particularly persuasive exam ples o f substances that are goods. Menn ( 1992) also
takes καί to be epexegetic (see his illum inating discussion at 551 -53); and so do Broadie (1991, 54n21)
and Urmson (1988, 121).
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mean [things] in all the categories [ού γάρ αν έλέγετ έν πάσαις ταις
κατηγορίας] but in one only.
Although much in this passage calls for explication, its essential point is clear: the good is
not one thing but many, since “good” means things in all the categories--or, as A ristotle
might have said, since goods are found in all the categories. This is not very similar to the
A.7 passage. The point here is not at all integrative, but rather the opposite: it is to show
that goods are many and irreducibly diverse, not to point out w hat is common to diverse
goods. There seems little w arrant, then, for claiming that these tw o passages are
“strikingly similar.”66
If this account o f A.7 and A.6 is correct, then, not only is it not true that they are
“strikingly similar,” it is not the case that “the good in A is x” is present in both o f them.
It is present in A.7, o f course, but not in A.6. W hereas the A.7 expression states w hat the
good is and the A.6 expression says w hat it means (“‘good’ means things in A: for
example, x”), the implicit expression in A.6 corresponding to the one in A.7 is: “there are
goods in A: for example, x.” These expressions are not interchangeable, not ju st because
the x given is the good in A in the one and m erely one example o f a good in A in the
other, but for other, more radical reasons. In “the good in A is x,” A ranges over actions
and courses o f action, and the variables for x, although specific things different from one
another (such as health and victory), are always ends and are identified as such. This is
not the case for “there are goods in A: for example, x.” Here the A ’s are categories, the
x’s are goods in those categories, and, contrary to w hat M acDonald would have us
believe, there is no indication that the x ’s are also ends. Although they may also be ends
for Aristotle, because they are goods and goods are sometimes things sought, there is no
mention o f this in the passage--as is not surprising, since to m ention that any o f the goods
have something in common would not only be irrelevant to the point being made but
would undermine it. In any case, there is no indication that the x ’s are the ends o f the A ’s
given, as is the case for the A.7 expression.67
66 This discussion has o f course assumed that “‘good’ is spoken o f in A, where it is x” is in fact the
expression that w e find in the A.6 passage on Irwin’s translation. That, however, is not actually true.
On his translation the expression would be “‘good’ is spoken o f in A as x ,” and this, whatever its
precise meaning, is quite different from what M acDonald claim s it to be, since it does not also say that
the good in A is x, only that it is spoken o f as x. The difference between the A .7 and A .6 expressions
therefore would be even greater than M acDonald’s choice o f words would have us believe.
67 Similar remarks can be made for the corresponding expression in the Topics passage (A.15: 107a3-12)
which MacDonald uses to support h is claim that the A .7 and A .6 expressions are interchangeable. I
translate this passage, where Aristotle is trying to help us spot ambiguity, as follows:
Look also at the kinds o f categories signified by the name and see whether they are the
same in all cases; for if they are not the same, it is clear that the thing said is homonymous. For
example, the good in the case o f food is that w hich is productive o f pleasure; in the case o f
m edicine, that which is productive o f health; in the case o f [the] soul, being o f a certain quality—
for example, [being] o f sound m ind or [being] m anly or [being] just; and sim ilarly in the case o f
man. Here and there [it is] a time; for exam ple, the opportune tim e is a good, for the opportune
time is called [a] good. Often it is a quantity, for example, in the case o f the moderate amount,
for also the moderate amount is called [a] good. The good, then, is homonymous.
The corresponding expression here is “the good in the case o f A is x ,” verbally alm ost the same as the
one in A.7. Here, again, the A ’s are not sim ply actions and courses o f action but exam ples from several
categories: food, m edicine (or the art o f m edicine), the soul, and man. (The A ’s are not specified for the
opportune tim e and the moderate amount.) The x ’s are varied. Some are ends: health, the good in the
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5. T he dom ains o f A an d x in “th e good in A is x”
M acDonald’s second claim concerns the substitution instances o f A and x in “the
good in (or for an) A is x”: A ranges over human actions and activities and things having a
function, x over real natures or properties—where “real natures” or “real properties” seem
to mean universals (τα καθόλου), and where universale subsume essences (τα τί ην
είναι)68. Since this claim is made on the assumption that “the good in A is x” occurs in
both the A.7 and A.6 passages and are interchangeable,69 this is to claim that A and x
range over the domains indicated in both passages.70
We have already seen that this is not an accurate specification o f the domain for A,
the domains differing in the tw o passages. In the A.7 passage, the concrete instances o f
the expression m ention only actions and activities (or “courses o f action”), not things
having a function. M acDonald admits this71 but goes on to point out that “A ristotle in
fact believes that m ore than just human actions [and activities] have ends or goods”72—
human beings and other things do, too. That is indeed true, but w hat is to the point here is
that none o f the substitution instances o f A in the A.7 passage are things having a
function. In the A.6 passage, on the other hand, A ranges over the categories, and, since

case o f the m edical art, is also its a id . However, not all are: that which is productive o f pleasure, the
good in the case o f food, is not the end in the case o f food but rather that food, among other foods, which
produces the sensation o f pleasure in us when eaten, so that that kind o f food is the good in the case o f
food, not because it is an end sought (although it often is), but because it produces a certain effect in us.
It is surprising neither that the goods here are not a ll ends nor that they are not identified as such, for
that, again, is irrelevant to the point o f the passage. The point o f the passage is that a thing said is
homonymous whenever its name signifies different categories in different cases, and that the good
illustrates this. It therefore would not have served A ristotle’s point for him to m ention that m any goods
have in common being ends, or to m ention that they have anything at all in common; as for the A.6
passage, it w ould have undermined his point, since their difference, not their sam eness, is important
here.
68 See 160-61, and 168: “The property o f being good is no single real property, no single Aristotelian
universal.”
69And in the Topics passage, as w ell.
70The purpose served by claim ing that A also ranges over things having a function seem s to be to link the
m eanings o f “the good in A is x” as it occurs in A .7 and A .6. If w e assume that “the good in A is x”
occurs in both A 7 and A .6 and i f it is true that A ranges also over things having a function, then some
degree o f overlap in m eaning would be effected between the occurrences o f the expression in A .7 (which
talks about human actions and activities but not about things having a function) and A .6 (which talks
not about human actions and activities as such but, among other things, about substances, which,
M acDonald w ill argue, are things having a function). However, w e m ay observe that i f M acDonald’s
first and central claim were in fact true, he would not need to argue that A ranges over things having a
function as w ell as over human actions and activities. If “the good in A is x” and “‘good’ is spoken o f in
A, where it is x” really ware interchangeable, then the substitution instances o f A in “the good in A is x”
would be identical in both occurrences o f the expression, in A .7 and A .6, and, since A .6 is to be read in
terms o f A .7, they would all be instances o f the sort that have ends—nam ely, the corresponding
substitution instances o f x. This, presumably, is the position M acDonald desires.
71See 164.
72
164.
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the categories for A ristotle include everything that exists, it necessarily ranges over human
actions and activities and things having a function (although none o f its substitution
instances are specified as such); but it o f course ranges over many other things as well. It
is therefore inaccurate to specify the domain o f A as human actions and activities and
things having a function.73
Although M acDonald does not explicitly argue for the claim that x ranges over real
natures or properties, he does offer an implicit argument, and his discussion o f homonymy
in A ristotle74 plays a large role in this. For A ristotle, to paraphrase M acDonald, F is
homonymous, if and only if there are at least tw o things, x and y, that are F and the
account o f x ’s Fness and y’s Fness are different—that is, a different real nature or property
is signified by the tw o accounts (Pi); good is homonymous (P 2 ); therefore, “there are at
least two good things, x and y, such that the account o f x ’s goodness and the account o f
y’s goodness are different; that is, a different real nature or property is signified by the tw o
accounts”75 (C i). W hat is stressed in this argument is that the tw o goods are different
real natures or properties, but it is o f course also true that both are real natures or
properties o f one sort or another (anything homonymous w ould have to be). However,
M acDonald, presumably on grounds o f the argument ju st stated, assumes that all goods
are real natures or properties76 (C2). If so, then, since the x ’s in “the good in A is x” are
identified as goods (P3), he can arrive at his final conclusion that the x ’s in “the good in A
is x” are real natures or properties (C3).
I believe that the first argument here is sound: good is homonymous for A ristotle,
the account o f homonymy given is accurate, and the conclusion follows. However, it
clearly does not follow that all goods are real natures or properties (C2). It is not true,
either. Although A ristotle’s conclusion in the Topics passage considered is that good is
homonymous (P2), that is not precisely w hat he says in A.6. In A.6 he says that “good”
means, or signifies, things in all the categories, and this is a claim broader than the claim
that good is homonymous. It allows for the accounts o f “good” to signify real natures or
properties and thus for good to be homonymous, but it also allows for them to signify
particular substances as well as particular qualities and other particular nonsubstances.77
Aristotle himself says that “good” signifies Odysseus, Helen, Paris and Achilles,78 and he
would no doubt have agreed that it also signifies the particular herbs and actions that are
productive o f health, to mention no others. It also signifies god, as w e know, and god,
because he is not a universal,79 is not a property or a real nature. The more accurate w ay
to label A ristotle’s goods, I would argue, is to call them existents (οντα), which is w hat
73 It is also inaccurate to specify it in this way for the Topics passage, as I have argued above.
See 160-61.
’161.
76This is im plicit in his discussion o f the ‘M ultiple-natures interpretation o f homonymy” on 160-62, for
example.
77 By “‘F’ signifies x,” I mean, not “‘F’ is truly predicated o f x ,” but that “F ’ signifies x in m uch the same
way that “Socrates” signifies Socrates or “white [color]” signifies w hite [color], a universal that m aybe
truly predicated o f him and other things.
78See Rhetoric A.6: 1363al 6-19. I discuss this passage in “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the
Good.”
79 Not being “said o f’ (λέγεται κατά, κατηγορεί κατά) or “in” (υπάρχει, έν) other things in the relevant
sense.
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the constituents o f the categories are.80 If this is correct, then M acDonald’s third
argument, although valid, does not persuade us o f its conclusion. It need not be true that
the x ’s in “the good in A is x” are real natures or properties: they might not be, since not
all goods are real natures or properties. I conclude, therefore, that M acDonald’s claim
that x ranges over real natures and properties is inaccurate, and that the larger suggestion
that for A ristotle all goods are real natures or properties is false.

6. T he end o r good fo r substances qua substances
I f M acDonald’s claim that A.6 may be read in term s o f A.7 is not well founded,
then his claim that substances qua substances have a function does not seem w ell founded
either, w hether that function is to exist independently or anything else. It is because A.6
may be read in term s o f A.7 that substances qua substances have ends, and it is because
they have ends that they have functions--that is the most natural w ay to explain their
having ends, on the assumption that they do. If, then, A.6 may not be read in term s o f
A.7, this entire edifice seems to collapse. Even if it is true that the A ’s in “the good in A is
x” as it occurs in A.6 include things having a function, because they include substances,
that still w ould not mean that substances qua substances have a function (or that qualities
qua qualities have a function, and so on), only that those substances having a function
have a function. M oreover, even if w e w ere to grant that for A ristotle substances qua
substances have a function, there seems little reason to believe that this function would be
to exist independently. M acDonald offers no direct textual evidence to support his claim
that A ristotle held this view—and that is hardly surprising, for the view is absurd on the
face o f it. For a substance to exist independently o f nonsubstances and sensible substances
is merely for its existence not to be dependent on them, for their nonexistence not to result
in or involve its nonexistence; it is merely for it to stand in a certain relationship to them,
and a negative one at that, and for it to stand in that relationship is not for it to do
anything~it is not for it perform any activity or action, and so it is not for it to possess any
εργον at all.
O f course, M acDonald recognizes that existing independently is not really the
function o f substances. According to him, it is “analogous” to a function and therefore
can be “construed as” such and is so “in a sense.” However, it is difficult to see how he
has much o f a case here, unless existing independently really is perform ing a function.
A.6, according to him, should be interpreted along the lines o f A.7. If so, then in A.6
A ristotle is saying that the good for, o r in the case of, substances is god and mind, w here
god and mind are the ends for substances. The idea that substances qua substances have a
function, and specifically the function o f existing independently, is then introduced to
account for how substances qua substances can have ends and for why specifically god
and mind are their ends. For M acDonald to say, then, that existing independently is not
really the function o f substances qua substances but merely something analogous to it is
for him to destroy his case. It is for him to say that this is not, in fact, the function o f

801 have argued for this point at som e length in 1988.
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substances qua substances; it is to imply—since this is supposed to be the function o f
substances qua substances—that they have no function at all; and it is to say that god and
mind are not, in fact, their ends. Therefore, for M acDonald to say that substances qua
substances have a function only “in a sense”81 is for him to admit, in effect, that his model
for explaining the A.6 passage fails when applied to substances.
There is, in fact, nothing in the A.6 passage about substances striving for the
independent existence o f god or mind, about god or mind being their end or completeness.
God and mind are given no pre-eminent status there—quite the contrary, they are merely
examples o f goods in the category o f substance (as are the virtues in the category o f
quality, and so on for the other categories); nor is that surprising, for the conclusion
Aristotle is driving at there does not require any pre-eminent status for any o f them—he
merely needs any old example or tw o for each category.

7. The paradigm instances of nonsubstances
If M acDonald’s model for explaining the A.6 passage fails for substances, it seems
to fail even more for nonsubstances. In order for his model to w ork for, or fit, qualities,
quantities, and the remaining nonsubstances (now the A ’s in “the good in A is x”), the A ’s
must, for every nonsubstance category, be either human actions or activities or things
having a function, and that is not the case for every nonsubstance category. Precisely
speaking it is not the case for any o f the nonsubstance categories, since no nonsubstance
category is accurately identified either as human action or as human activity or as thing
having a function. Also, for every nonsubstance category, the x ’s in every case must be
the ends, or paradigm instances, o f their respective A’s, and that is not the case either: the
virtues, for example, are not the ends o f qualities qua qualities or their paradigm instances.
MacDonald o f course recognizes this.82 Only in an “extended sense”83 is it true
that there are ends for or paradigm instances o f them—that is his third claim. This,
however, is also for him to admit, in effect, that his model for explaining A.6 fails to
apply: for every nonsubstance category there must really be ends, or paradigm instances,
in order for his model to work, and M acDonald admits that there are not.
The basis for his claim that in an extended sense there are paradigm instances o f
nonsubstances admittedly is sound enough. His basis is that, since “actions, activities, and
things having a function. . . have ends or goods,” w e can say, and A ristotle w ould have
agreed, that “qualities, quantities, relations, times and places are good relative to the
goods o f actions, activities, and things w ith functions.”84 The question, however, is
whether this is the reason why A ristotle considered the nonsubstances given in the A.6

81We may also ask whether existing independently is even analogous to performing a function. They are
not analogous by example, as the role o f the heart m ay be analogous to the role o f a m echanical pump;
nor are they analogous relations, as mathematical proportions m ay be. Just how are they supposed to be
analogous?
82See 171.

83171.
84172.
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passage to be goods, and it does not seem that it can be. A fter having argued in our
passage that the good cannot be one thing because goods fall into all the categories, he
goes on, a little later in the same chapter, to speculate about how these disparate goods
might be connected or united: “But what, then, does it [i.e., the good] mean? It certainly
is not like the things bearing the same name by chance. But then do absolutely all goods
belong to one class at least85 by being [derived] from one thing or [by being] relative to
one thing? Or [do all goods belong to one class] rather by analogy (for as sight is in the
body, so reason is in the soul, and so on in other cases)?”86 It is evident from this passage
that the goods about w hose connection to one another he is speculating are already
considered by him to be goods, and that he expects his reader to consider them to be so,
even before he has arrived at a satisfactory answer to how they might be connected. It
therefore w ill not do to say that some o f these, the nonsubstances given, are goods for
Aristotle by virtue o f that connection or relation; they w ere goods to begin with, or at
least A ristotle considered them to be so, and only later began to wonder about their
connection or unity.

8. Conclusion
It must be said, then, that M acDonald’s attem pt at explicating the A.6 passage is
not successful. Although his main conclusion--that A ristotle’s examples in the A.6
passage are goods, and that these goods are “real natures” or “properties”--happens to be
largely true, the interpretation o f the A.6 passage he offers in support o f this conclusion
will not stand up to scrutiny. There is no w arrant for interpreting the A.6 passage in term s
o f the A.7 discussion, and even if there w ere, such that w e should have to accept his
model for interpreting the A.6 passage, that model fails on its own terms.

85 “At least,” since there is no common thing uniting them.
861096b26-29.
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